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FIRST AMENDMENT-Criminal Libel Statute Held
Unconstitutional as Applied to Public Statements
Involving Public Concerns: State v. Powell
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Powell,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that
New Mexico's criminal libel statute 2 violated the First Amendment when
applied to public statements involving matters of public concern. Prior
to Powell, New Mexico courts were silent on the application of the
criminal libel statute to public concern cases. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has not spoken "regarding the extent of any
constitutional privilege against criminal prosecution for defamatory
the defamed person
statements involving matters of public concern when
3
'
In Powell, the court
is neither a public official nor a public figure.
first announced4
libel,
applied the actual malice standard for public figure
Co. v. Sullivan
Times
York
New
in
Court
by the United States Supreme
statute.
libel
almost 30 years ago, to New Mexico's criminal
While conforming to standards set by the Supreme Court and adopted
in other states, the decision in Powell did not go as far as some would
like. The court of appeals backed down from the stance taken by the
district court, which held the entire statute to be unconstitutional on
its face. The Powell court instead limited the statute's application to
cases not requiring the actual malice standard. This Note reviews the
origins of the actual malice standard as applied to public statements,
examines the effect of Powell's rationale on New Mexico law, and
discusses the approach taken by Judge Donnelly in his dissent.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David William Powell, a teacher at Western New Mexico University,
5
was convicted of criminal libel in Grant County magistrate court. The
conviction stemmed from accusations Powell had made against the
university's acting vice-president for academic affairs, concerning the
vice-president's performance in that position. Powell exercised his statutory right to appeal to New Mexico District Court of Grant County
and received a trial de novo. Powell moved to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that the criminal libel statute was unconstitutional on
its face and unconstitutional as applied to the charge against him. The
district court granted Powell's motion, holding that the statute was
1. 114 N.M. 395, 839 P.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1992).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
3. State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 399, 839 P.2d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 1992).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. The facts of this case are set out in State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 396, 839 P.2d 139,
140 (Ct. App. 1992).
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unconstitutional on its face and as applied to libel of public officials
or public figures, and that Powell's libel was against a public figure.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal, but on different grounds. Using a separate ground addressed
in the appellate briefs, 6 the court of appeals held the statute unconstitutional when applied to public concern libel cases. 7
III.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
The Powell court looked to the United States Supreme Court for
guidance in determining the fate of Powell and the New Mexico criminal
libel statute. 8 The court examined the history of criminal libel statutes
and historic United States Supreme Court decisions which created the
actual malice standard in libel law, extended that standard to criminal
libel statutes, and applied the actual malice standard to punitive damages
in civil cases.9
A.

The Actual Malice Standard-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
In the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 0 the
United States Supreme Court recognized a qualified privilege to make
defamatory statements relating to the official conduct of public officials.
In New York Times, the Montgomery, Alabama police commissioner
sued the New York Times, alleging that he had been libeled by statements in a full-page advertisement published in the Times." Sullivan
won $500,000 in damages in the circuit court of Montgomery County,
and the award was sustained in the Alabama Supreme Court. 2
The United States Supreme Court reversed Alabama's decision,"
holding that the Constitution "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-

6. While the district court alluded to the statute's unconstitutionality as applied to matters
of public concern, its opinion focused primarily on the facial challenge to the statute. See State
v. Powell, No. CR 91-026, letter op. at 4-5 (Grant County Dist. Ct. of N.M. July 30, 1991).
In its appellate brief, the State argued that the district court had misapplied the public concern
test, and the State contended that the complainant was not a public figure. State v. Powell,
114 N.M. 395, 396 n.l, 839 P.2d 139, 140 n.l (Ct. App. 1992). The court of appeals held that
its focus on the public concern/public figure issue rather than the facial challenge was not unfair
to the State, especially since the State's brief addressed the public figure issue. Id.
7. Powell, 114 N.M. at 396, 839 P.2d at 140.
8. Id. at 399, 839 P.2d at 143. A lack of New Mexico precedent forced the court to rely
on federal cases. See infra note 33. Note also that the current incarnation of the New Mexico
criminal libel statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), was enacted one year
before the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 303, § 11-1.
9. Powell, 114 N.M. at 397-400, 839 P.2d at 141-44.
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. The advertisement stated that police had committed acts of violence against civil rights
protesters; Sullivan was Commissioner of Public Affairs for Montgomery, and in charge of the
Montgomery police department. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256-57.
12. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
13. Id. at 292.
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that is, with knowledge that it4 was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.'
B. Actual Malice Applied to Criminal Prosecutions
The court in Powell noted that while the New York Times decision
applied to a civil libel case, the Supreme Court had implied that the
5
privilege applied to criminal libel prosecutions as well.' The Court
16
clarified that implication in Garrison v. Louisiana, holding that the
New York Times privilege "limits state power to impose criminal
' 7
sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials.'
Garrison was convicted of criminal defamation after issuing a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of eight judges in the criminal
district court of Orleans Parish.' 8 The Supreme Court, in reversing
Garrison's conviction, held that criminal libel statutes did not serve
9
different interests than civil libel statutes.' The lack of distinction gave
the Court no reason to apply a different standard for criminal libel
statutes than for civil libel statutes, 20 and thus the Court held Louisiana's
statute unconstitutional because it lacked the actual malice standard
2
for criticism of the official conduct of public officials. ' Since Garrison,
the Supreme Court has not explored the scope22of the New York Times
privilege as applied to criminal libel statutes.
C. Actual Malice and Punitive Damages
The actual malice standard established in New York Times and
extended in Garrison has been further extended to include private-figure
plaintiffs in civil actions who wish to recover presumed or punitive
23
damages for defamation. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. the Supreme
Court held that the actual malice standard applied in a civil libel trial
involving punitive damages.
In Gertz, American Opinion magazine wrote an article about the
murder prosecution of a Chicago police officer. 24 As part of the article,

14. Id. at 279-80.
15. State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 399, 839 P.2d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) ("What a State may not constitutionally
bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of
libel.")).
16. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
17. Id. at 67.
18. Id. at 65-66.
19. For the Court's discussion on the erosion of historical differences between civil and
criminal libel statutes, see Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67-69.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 77.
22. The only other Supreme Court case to review a criminal libel statute was Ashton v.
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966). However, the Supreme Court did not discuss the New York
Times privilege; instead, the Court held Kentucky's criminal libel statute to be unconstitutionally
vague. Ashton, 384 U.S. at 200.
23. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
24. The facts of this case are set out in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-32.
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American Opinion tied the attorney representing the victim's family to
Communist activities and implied that his criminal record was extensive.
Gertz sued for libel, and the publisher, Robert Welch, Inc., claimed
the actual malice privilege. The district court held the statements to
be libelous per se, and the jury was allowed to determine only damages.
After the jury awarded $50,000, the district court decided that the New
York Times standard should apply, and entered a judgment n.o.v. for
Welch. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
and Gertz appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that Gertz was not a public figure, and
that states were entitled to set their own standards for compensation
of private individuals for libelous statements. 25 However, the Court
added that the state interest in compensation of private individuals did
not extend past actual injury to reputation. 26 For plaintiffs seeking
punitive damages, the Supreme Court required a higher standard, that
is, the actual malice requirement of "knowledge of falsity or reckless
'27
disregard for the truth.
The Gertz decision left some question about whether the actual malice
standard should be restricted only to punitive damages in a privateperson civil suit. The Supreme Court clarified its position in Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, holding that the actual malice standard is invoked only in cases of defamation of a private person which
involves a public concern. 28
Dun & Bradstreet, a credit bureau, was convicted of distributing
credit reports containing false information about Greenmoss. 29 The
Supreme Court found that the trial court failed to define "actual
malice" for the jury and failed to determine whether Greenmoss was
a public or private figure.30 The Court determined that states have a
higher interest in awarding presumed and punitive damages to private
figure plaintiffs, and may set a standard which is lower than the actual
malice standard.3 The Court went on to reason that when private
figures are libelled by speech which involves a matter of public concern,
the actual malice standard is required to award punitive damages. 32
IV. RATIONALE OF THE POWELL COURT
While New Mexico has little original defamation case law, the state
has adopted much of the United States Supreme Court's decisions

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 347.
Id. at 349.
Id.
472 U.S. 749 (1985).

29. Id. at 751-53. The interesting "media vs. nonmedia" issues on which the Vermont Supreme
Court rested its holding that Dun & Bradstreet was not entitled to the actual malice standard
are beyond the scope of this Note.
30. Id.at 754-55.
31. Id.at 761.
32. Id. Note that this formulation is often referred to in New Mexico as the "limited public
figure" test. See generally Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M. 331, 785 P.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1989).
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through civil libel cases in New Mexico.3 3 Few reported decisions have
interpreted New Mexico's criminal libel statute.3 4 Thus, relying primarily
on Supreme Court precedent, the New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded in Powell that "the Constitution prohibits a conviction of criminal libel for public defamation made without actual malice on a matter
of public concern." ' 35 Since Powell's statements constituted public defamation, the court sustained the dismissal of the State's complaint.
The court first reviewed the purposes of American criminal libel law.
Next, the court reviewed the constitutionality of New Mexico's criminal
libel statutes and the State's arguments on the statute's construction.
Finally, the court applied its holding to Powell's criminal charge.
Purposes of Criminal Libel Statutes
Lacking a precedential interpretation of the New Mexico criminal
libel statute, the court of appeals instead reviewed the purposes of
criminal libel law in the United States. First, the court compared criminal
penalties and punitive damages to determine "the interests served by
permitting their imposition and the injury their imposition may cause
to First Amendment interests." ' 36 The court concluded that free speech
interests outweigh the imposition of civil or criminal liability for defamation "made without actual malice on a matter of public concern,"
37
except when a private person sues for actual injuries suffered.
The court of appeals noted the Supreme Court's implication that
"criminal libel laws serve very little, if any, purpose.''13 The court
pointed to the Supreme Court's approval of a comment made in the
official draft of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code, explaining the lack of criminal libel provisions:
A.

It goes without saying that penal sanctions cannot be justified merely
by the fact that defamation is evil or damaging to a person in ways
that entitle him to maintain a civil suit. Usually we reserve the
criminal law for harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the

33. See Marchiando v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982) (adopting the New York
Times standard of actual malice for public figure plaintiffs); Furgason v. Clausen, 109 N.M.
331, 785 P.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1989) (incorporating Gertz into New Mexico law and establishing
the test for determining whether a libel victim is a "limited public figure" as whether the
offending material concerns a public controversy or is a topic of public concern). Neither decision
considered the application of New Mexico's criminal libel statute.
34. Three early decisions dealt specifically with criminal libel, but all were based on the
earlier incarnation of the statute, 1889 N.M. Laws, ch. 11. The current version of the statute,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), omitted some of the earlier law's provisions
and added a definition of libel and the requirement that statements must be false (to conform
with N.M. CoNsT. art. lI,§ 17). The State opposed Powell's motion for dismissal at the district
court level, partially on the grounds that "the statute has yet to be applied in a court of
record." State's Memorandum of Law at 4, State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 839 P.2d 139 (Ct.
App. 1992) (No. 13,398).
35. State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 399, 839 P.2d 139, 143, (Ct. App. 1992).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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community's sense of security . . . . It seems evident that personal
calumny falls in neither of these classes in the U.S.A. that it is
therefore inappropriate for penal control, and that this probably
accounts for the paucity of prosecutions and the near desuetude of
private criminal libel legislation in this country.3 9
The court added that while the Supreme Court has not held all criminal
libel laws to violate constitutional rights to free expression, 40 it has
"clearly signalled the small weight to be given a claimed interest
in
criminal prosecution." ' 4' Combining this history of criminal libel purposes, the court of appeals concluded that false defamatory public
statements involving matters of public concern may "be subject to
criminal penalty only if made with actual malice." ' 42 The court then
proceeded to determine whether New Mexico's statute required a finding
of actual malice.
B.

Constitutionality of New Mexico's Criminal Libel Statute
The Powell court compared the Supreme Court's statement in New
York Times, that actual malice amounted to a statement made "with
knowledge that it [is] false or with reckless disregard of whether it [is]
false or not, ' 43 with New Mexico's statutory definition of malice:
[Ain act done with evil or mischievous design and it is not necessary
to prove any special facts showing ill-feeling on the part of the
person who is concerned in making, printing, publishing or circulating a libelous statement against the person injured thereby."
The court concluded that the statutory definition of malice was not
the equivalent of "actual malice" as defined by the Supreme Court. 45
Conceding that the two were not the same, the State argued that the
constitutional defects in the statute could be cured through jury instructions on the actual malice standard in cases which require it.4
The court of appeals rejected the State's arguments in three areas.
First, the State argued that jury instructions are procedural law rather
than substantive law, and thus subject to the power of the judiciary. 47
The court quickly rejected that argument, saying "[t]o adopt the State's
39. Id. at 399-400, 839 P.2d at 143-44 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 69-70
(1964) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 commentary at 44 (Tentative Draft 1961))).
40. For example, false statements made with actual malice enjoy no constitutional protection.
Powell, 114 N.M. at 399-400, 839 P.2d at 143-44 (citing Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75).
41. Powell, 114 N.M. at 400, 839 P.2d at 144 (citing Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d
1087, 1094 (8th Cir. 1973) ("A strong argument may be made that there remains little constitutional
vitality to criminal libel laws.")).
42. Powell, 114 N.M. at 401, 839 P.2d at 145.
43. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)); see also
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966) ("ill will, evil motive, [or] intention to injure" does
not amount to actual malice).
44. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
45. Powell, 114 N.M. at 401, 839 P.2d at 145.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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argument would be to say that in every matter tried to a jury, the
judiciary is not bound by statutes in setting forth to the jury the
applicable law.'"'4
Next, the State argued that statutory construction required the court
to adopt a construction upholding the statute's constitutionality when
49
it can be construed to support or void the statute. While agreeing
with the State's statement of statutory construction rules, the court of
appeals concluded that the actual malice standard could not be found
"inany rational construction of the language of Section 30-11-1 defining
the requisite intent for criminal libel." 50 The court reasoned:
Because the statute defines the requisite intent, this is not a case
where one can argue that statutory silence on the state-of-mind
element of the offense creates an ambiguity. Moreover, it would
stretch the imagination beyond human limits to say that there is
an ambiguity in the criminal libel statute that permits it to be
construed to require actual malice when the Constitution so requires
but not to require actual malice otherwise."
The State's last "interesting,1 5 2 but unsuccessful, argument was to ask
53
the court "merely to read the statute together with the Constitution.
The State cited two cases which it claimed supported this view, State
v. Elder 4 and Reese v. State."
The court explained that Elder did not add an element to the statutory
definition of the offense, but rather "was recognizing a constitutional
defense to the criminal charge." '5 6 The court refused to apply Reese
because a majority of the New Mexico Supreme Court "did not adopt
the view that the judicial branch could add an element to an offense
if so required by the Constitution.""57 Further, the Powell court found
no support in the law of other jurisdictions which would permit the

48. Id.
49. Id. (citing New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 95 N.M. 588, 591, 624
P.2d 530, 533 (1981)).
50. Powell, 114 N.M. at 402, 839 P.2d at 146.
51. Id. at 402, 839 P.2d at 146 (citing State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 562, 817 P.2d 1196,
1204 (1991) (statutory construction of criminal statutes where intent is essential element of
defense)).
52. Powell, 114 N.M. at 402, 839 P.2d at 146.
53. Id.

54. 19 N.M. 393, 143 P. 482 (1914).
55. 106 N.M. 498, 745 P.2d 1146 (1987) (plurality opinion).
56. Powell, 114 N.M. at 402, 839 P.2d at 146. The criminal libel statute in Elder prohibited
truth as a defense in almost all cases of libel. 1889 N.M. Laws, ch. 11, § 1-25. The New Mexico
Supreme Court ruled that this portion of the statute violated the New Mexico Constitution.
Elder, 19 N.M. at 402, 143 P. at 484. "In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may
be given in evidence to the jury ...." N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17; see, e.g., Esquibel v. State,
91 N.M. 498, 501, 576 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1978) (judicial practice to recognize defenses that do
not appear in statutes but are required by common law or the constitution).
57. Powell, 114 N.M. at 402, 839 P.2d at 146. The court of appeals also noted that in
Reese, one member of the majority did not rely on constitutional grounds, and two members
of the supreme court dissented. Judge Hartz further noted that the Reese court cited no authority
from any jurisdiction to support its conclusion in that case. Id.
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addition of an element to an offense by the judicial branch, and thus
"assume[d] that such is also the law in New Mexico." 8
Finally, the court reviewed decisions in other jurisdictions confronting
the question of how to interpret a criminal libel statute that does not
require proof of actual malice.1 9 The court of appeals noted that none
of those jurisdictions have inserted an actual-malice requirement into
the statute. Instead, "the debate has been whether to strike the statute
in its entirety,60 or whether to hold only that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defamation that cannot constitutionally be punished without proof of actual malice." ' 61 Concluding that it lacked the
power to revise the language of the New Mexico criminal libel statute,
the court of appeals held the statute "unconstitutional as applied to
a charge of libel predicated on public statements that involve matters
' 62
of public concern."
Having found the criminal libel statute unconstitutional as applied,
the court of appeals next turned to Powell's criminal charge. 63 The
court assumed the facts of the complaint to be true." The complaint
alleged that Powell made public accusations of misconduct involving
the complainant's position as acting vice-president for academic affairs
for Western New Mexico University. 65 Examining the "content, form,
and context""6 of the libelous statement, the court said:
[T]he complaint alleges statements relating to the performance of
the administration of a public institution of higher learning. This
subject is a matter of public concern. 67

58. Powell, 114 N.M. at 402, 839 P.2d at 146. The court of appeals relied on the United
States Supreme Court to bolster its reasoning. Id. (citing Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S.
500, 518 (1926) ("amendment may not be substituted for construction and ... a court may
not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.");
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98 (1879) (no judicial power to give statute a narrower meaning
in order to punish crimes not described in the language); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous if the Legislature could set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could rightfully
be detained and who should be set at large.")).
59. Powell, 114 N.M. at 403, 839 P.2d at 147.
60. Id. (citing Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978); Eberle v. Municipal Court,
127 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1972)).
61. Powell, 114 N.M. at 403, 839 P.2d at 147 (citing People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo.)
(en banc), cert denied 112 S. Ct. 177 (1991) (example of an unconstitutional statute as applied
to cases requiring actual malice)).
62. Powell, 114 N.M. at 403, 839 P.2d at 147.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 404, 839 P.2d at 148 (quoting United States v. Besmajian, 910 F.2d 1153, 1154
(3rd Cir. 1990) ("In considering a defense motion to dismiss [a complaint], the court accepts
as true the factual allegations set forth in the [complaint].")).
65. Powell, 114 N.M. at 404, 839 P.2d at 148. The court noted that the parties were never
identified by name in the complaint. Id. The complainant drafted her own complaint on a
magistrate court form. State's Brief-in-Chief at 3, State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 839 P.2d 139
(Ct. App. 1992) (No. 13,398).
66. Powell, 114 N.M. at 404, 839 P.2d at 148 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)).
67. Id. at 405, 839 P.2d at 149.
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Because Powell's alleged libel was a matter of public concern and thus
entitled to the New York Times privilege of actual malice, the New68
Mexico criminal libel statute was not available for prosecuting Powell.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case
against Powell.
C. PracticalEffect of Powell on New Mexico Law
Because of the Powell decision, until the New Mexico Legislature
chooses to revise the criminal libel statute, false statements made with
actual malice against public figures are unpunishable through criminal
proceedings. Public figures must resort to civil remedies, which have
kept up with the changes since New York Times. Further, the court
of appeals' decision gives little guidance as to whether criminal libel
laws continue to serve a compelling state interest in New Mexico. While
the court strongly hints that there seems to be little state interest in
criminal prosecution of libel,6 9 the court did not resolve the issue when
it refused to declare the statute unconstitutional in its entirety. One
judge on the panel, however, advocated declaring the statute facially

unconstitutional. 70
V.

ABOLISHING THE STATUTE-JUDGE DONNELLY'S
DISSENT

In a separate opinion, Judge Thomas Donnelly preferred the district
court's rationale and objected to the consideration of grounds not
argued before the district court. 7 Judge Donnelly noted that the libelous
material was never introduced into evidence nor stipulated to at the
district court level, precluding the court of appeals' determination of
72
whether the statement was indeed false or published with actual malice.
The lack of material also made it "difficult to determine as a matter7
1
of law" whether the material involved an issue of public concern.
Without this evidence, the court could not conclude that Powell's
4
statement was entitled to the actual malice standard. 7 However, under
the district court's analysis of the language of the criminal libel statute,
"the statute is facially inconsistent with the protections accorded under
the First Amendment." ' 7 Judge Donnelly stated that "[a] statute is
constitutionally overbroad and facially invalid if it encompasses con-

68. Id.
69. See supra notes 38-39, and accompanying text.
70. Powell, 114 N.M. at 405, 839 P.2d at 149 (Donnelly, J. concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 405-06, 839 P.2d at 149-50.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 406, 839 P.2d at 150.
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stitutionally protected, as well as unprotected, speech." ' 76 The judge
believed that the criminal libel statute as written permitted prosecution
of speech without meeting the actual malice requirement of New York
Times and Garrison.77 The statute's lack of distinction between public
and private figure plaintiffs made New Mexico's criminal libel statute
"facially invalid '7 8 when compared to First Amendment requirements.
Judge Donnelly agreed with the majority that the problems with the
statute could not be cured by jury instructions. However, he concluded
that the New Mexico Constitution required proof of the same standard
of malice in any criminal libel prosecution involving a matter of public
concern, "irrespective of the status of the person alleged to have been
79
defamed. "
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Powell decision limits the application of New Mexico's criminal
libel statute to defamatory statements which do not involve public
statements involving matters of public concern. The decision modifies
New Mexico criminal libel law to be compatible with the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan standard which requires proof of actual malice
in public concern cases. The New Mexico Court of Appeals leaves
unanswered the question of whether a criminal libel law is an effective
means of punishing defamatory statements. Similarly unanswered is the
question of whether New Mexico should even punish libel through its
criminal system, or whether its interests are better served through the
civil libel provisions. The court's inaction puts these questions back
into the legislative arena for consideration of whether the underlying
policies of criminal libel laws continue to be relevant in modern-day
New Mexico.
SHAD L. BROWN

76. Id. (citing People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1991)
(en banc); City of Seattle v. Huff, 767 P.2d 572 (Wash. 1989) (en banc); State v. Gattis, 105
N.M. 194, 730 P.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1986); Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1978)).
77. Powell, 114 N.M. at 406, 839 P.2d at 150 (Donnelly, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
78. Id. at 407, 839 P.2d at 151.
79. Id. (quoting N.M. CONST. art. II,§ 17: "In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth
may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged
as libelous is true and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall
be acquitted." (emphasis added)).

